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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tuesday following his official retirement from the Idaho 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jim Jones left a message with his 
former judicial assistant: “Hello Tresha, this is Jim Jones, do you 
remember me? I used to work there.”1 As his assistant for nearly 
forty years, principal planner of his retirement reception, and 
cataloger of the over 1,600 case files he heard during his tenure, 
she had not forgotten.2 But that would not stop Justice Jones from 
joking about it.   
As a person of tremendous personal, political, and judicial 
reputation in the State of Idaho, one could expect his manner to be 
distant, proud, and aware of his own importance. But this is not 
Justice Jones’ way. He is affable, approachable, and kind. During 
his tenure on the Court, he was also ever willing to mentor. Even 
during his time as Chief Justice, which carried substantial 
additional responsibility, he maintained his “open door” policy of 
being available to his law clerks and staff for questions or 
discussion any time his office door was open. In his twelve years on 
the Court, he mentored more than 24 law clerks, helping to prepare 
them for successful careers in the law. He also had a characteristic 
way of finding time for fun, from cleverly crafted puns and plays 
on words to pranks on longtime colleague and friend Justice 
Burdick, that endeared him to all.  
Justice Jones did not follow a traditional path to the Supreme 
Court. After serving two terms as Idaho Attorney General, he 
resumed private practice in the Boise area.3 About fourteen years 
later, he was sitting in his office with Alan Lance, who mentioned 
that he supposed Justice Jones would enter the race to replace 
Wayne Kidwell on the Supreme Court.4 “You’ve got to be kidding,” 
was Justice Jones first response, but after thinking it over, he 
                                                          
 1. Audio recording: Voicemail left by Jim Jones, Retired Chief Justice, Idaho 
Supreme Court, to Tresha Griffiths (Jan. 3, 2017) (on file with author). 
 2. See Dan Black, Justice Jim Jones Recalls a Remarkable Career, THE ADVOCATE, 
Jan. 2017, at 60, 62; see generally Idaho Supreme Court Voting Pattern Analysis, August 2002 
– May 2016 (unpublished internal collection) (on file with Roger S. Burdick, Chief Justice, 
Idaho Supreme Court) (hereinafter Voting Pattern Analysis). 
 3. Interview with Jim Jones, Retired Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise, 
Idaho (Jan. 30, 2017).  
 4. Id.  
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decided to run.5 His practice was getting a little routine, and the 
pressure from deadlines was getting old.6 He thought a seat on the 
high court would be a nice change of pace.7 Because of his time as 
Attorney General and his efforts to lower gas prices across the 
state, Jones ran unopposed.8 He said that “no one wanted to run 
against the guy who got gas prices lowered,” and that he received 
two campaign contributions, which he returned.9 He retained his 
seat in an unopposed election in 2010 and served until his term 
expired at the end of 2016.10 During his tenure, Justices Schroeder 
and Trout retired and Justices Warren Jones and Joel Horton were 
appointed to fill their respective seats.11 In his twelve years on the 
Court, Justice Jones authored the majority opinion in over 300 
cases, as well as roughly 84 concurrences and 49 dissenting 
opinions.12 Aside from the raw data, the impact of Justice Jim 
Jones on Idaho jurisprudence can be detected, in some small 
measure, by examination of several key majority opinions he 
authored as well as a few of his dissents. Accordingly, Part II of 
this paper will be dedicated to discussing several landmark cases 
in which Justice Jones authored the majority opinion, Part III will 
                                                          
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; Betsy Z. Russell, Jim Jones faces no race for court seat, THE SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW (May 22, 2004), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2004/may/22/jim-jones-faces-no-
race-for-court-seat/.  
 9. Interview with Jim Jones, Retired Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise, 
Idaho (Jan 30. 2017).  
 10. Betsy Z. Russell, Justice Jones Responds to Justice Burdick’s Challenger, THE 
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2010/apr/27/justice-jones-responds-justice-burdicks-
challenger/.  
 11. District Judge Joel Horton named to Idaho Supreme Court, THE OREGONIAN 
(Sept. 18, 2007), 
http://blog.oregonlive.com/breakingnews/2007/09/horton_named_to_idaho_supreme.html; Jill 
Kuraitis, Warren Jones Appointed To Idaho Supreme Court, NEWWEST (June 26, 2007), 
http://newwest.net/city/article/warren_jones_appointed_to_idaho_supreme_court/C108/L108/. 
 12. See generally Voting Pattern Analysis, supra note 2. 
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conduct a review of several cases in which he dissented from the 
majority, and Part IV will conclude.  
II. PART II 
As one of five justices, and given the powerful doctrine of stare 
decisis,13 even a jurist of tremendous impact would likely only 
oversee subtle shifts in the law in a decade or more of service. This 
part will explore majority opinions authored by Justice Jones that 
signal shifts in the law that have the potential to become more 
significant changes in the years to come.  
A. Idaho Ground Water Association v. Idaho Department of Water 
Resources14 
In early 2016, the Court issued a trio of opinions addressing 
district court decisions related to Rangen, Inc.’s delivery calls for 
water.15  The second of these opinions, Idaho Ground Water 
Association v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, dealt with the 
competing doctrines of prior appropriation and beneficial use.16 
Departing from decades of strict adherence to prior appropriation, 
the Court upheld the Director of the Idaho Department of Water 
Resources’ decision to impose a trim line, or curtailment boundary, 
which allowed junior users to pump groundwater outside the 
curtailment area.17 Rangen held five water rights that it used to 
operate its fish hatchery near Hagerman, Idaho.18 Rangen alleged 
two of these rights, water right no. 36–02551 and water right no. 
36–07694, were injured by groundwater pumping in the Eastern 
                                                          
 13. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, “[w]hen there is controlling 
precedent on questions of Idaho law ‘the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless 
it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice.’” Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130, 142 Idaho 
589, 592 (2006) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 803 P.2d 978, 983, 119 Idaho 72, 
77 (1990)). 
 14. 369 P.3d 897, 160 Idaho 119 (2016). 
 15. Id.; Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 367 P.3d 193, 159 Idaho 798 
(2016) Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 371 P.3d 305, 160 Idaho 251 (2016).    
 16. See Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 369 P.3d 897, 160 Idaho 119. 
 17. Id. at 907, 160 Idaho at 129. 
 18. Id. at 900, 160 Idaho at 122. 
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Snake Plains Aquifer (“ESPA”).19 Accordingly, Rangen filed  
petitions for a delivery call, first in 2003 and again in 2011, seeking 
to have junior priority groundwater pumping limited to increase 
water flow to its facility.20 A curtailment order was issued in early 
2004 but was withdrawn after the Director of Idaho Department of 
Water Resources (“Director”) concluded that curtailment of junior 
ground water rights would not substantially increase flow to 
Rangen.21 Subsequent modeling innovation suggested that 
curtailment of ground water pumping could have a substantial 
effect on flow to Rangen, and that prior models’ measurements had 
been inaccurate.22 Rangen then filed its second delivery call in 
2011.23 The Director issued another curtailment order, limiting 
junior priority users’ ability to pump groundwater, but 
implemented a trim line, or curtailment order boundary, which 
allowed junior users to pump outside the boundary.24 The district 
court affirmed the curtailment order but determined that the 
Director impermissibly applied the trim line.25  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Jones, 
held that the Director was within his discretion to impose the trim 
line because of the policy of beneficial use.26 The Court stated that 
“the policy of securing the maximum use and benefit, and least 
wasteful use of Idaho’s water resources, has long been the policy in 
Idaho” and that “[t]his policy limits the prior appropriation 
doctrine by excluding from its purview water that is not being put 
to beneficial use.”27 These policy statements were followed by 
citations to the Court’s recent decisions in Clear Springs Foods, 
                                                          
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 900–01, 160 Idaho at 122–23. 
 22. Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 369 P.3d at 901, 160 Idaho at 123. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 902–903, 160 Idaho at 125–26. 
 25. Id. at 903, 160 Idaho at 126. 
 26. Id. at 907, 160 Idaho at 129. 
 27. Id. at 909, 160 Idaho at 131.  
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Inc. v. Spackman28 and American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. 
Idaho Department of Water Resource;29 two cases from 1909; and 
an Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”) internal 
management rule, CMR 20.03.30 Essentially, the Court reasoned 
that recognizing Rangen’s rights to the exclusion of all others, 
which is what prior appropriation would dictate, would not be the 
most beneficial use because it would “curtail irrigation to hundreds 
of thousands of acres so that Rangen might get another 1.5 cfs of 
water.”31 The majority viewed the Director’s decision imposing a 
trim line as a reasonable balance of the senior rights of Rangen 
and the junior users, and a proper application of Idaho water law, 
because there was some support for beneficial use in recent 
decisions of the Court.32 Although not stated in terms indicating 
jurisprudential departure, the Court’s decision effectively 
recognized a beneficial use limitation on the most powerful water 
rights doctrine of the West—prior appropriation.33 To be sure, the 
Court’s decision was focused on the specific case before it, and it 
was careful to continue to assert the priority rights of Rangen,34 
but the Court also nimbly suggested that absolute rights for the 
senior holder may not be the most efficient or beneficial use of the 
water. Because it declared that beneficial use may be a limitation 
on prior appropriation—a water rights doctrine steeped in history 
and widely adopted in the West—this decision stepped outside 
precedent and suggested a new way forward in water rights law. 
Right or wrong, the impact of this decision and its power to affect 
                                                          
 28. 252 P.3d 71, 78, 150 Idaho 790, 797 (2011). 
 29. 154 P.3d 433, 440, 143 Idaho 862, 869 (2007). 
 30. Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 369 P.3d at 909, 160 Idaho at 131. 
 31. Id. at 910, 160 Idaho at 132. 
 32. Id. at 910–911, 160 Idaho at 132–33. 
 33. As indicated by Justice Eismann’s dissent, prior appropriation is provided for in 
Article XV section 3 the Idaho Constitution. Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 369 P.3d at 915–16, 
160 Idaho at 138–39 (Eismann, J., dissenting). Additionally, a variation of the doctrine has 
been adopted by seventeen western states. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: 
A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 228, 229 (2015).    
 34. In fact, the majority declared that “the trim line here does not reduce the decreed 
quantities of Rangen’s water rights. Rangen remains entitled to the full measure of its rights, 
subject to availability of water and beneficial use limitations.” Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 369 
P.3d 897, 910, 160 Idaho 119, 132 (2015).    
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the decisions to come is stronger than its language suggested and 
signals great potential for a future shift in the law.     
B. Wasden v. State Board of Land Commissioners35 
Some cases signal shifts in the law, such as Idaho Ground 
Water Association above, and others restore bedrock principles and 
established legal doctrines. A case of the latter type, authored by 
Justice Jones in 2012, was Wasden v. State Board of Land 
Commissioners.36 In Wasden, the Attorney General challenged a 
state statute, Idaho Code Section 58–310A, that exempted state 
endowment cottage site leases from the requirement that the sites 
be leased to the highest bidder at an auction.37 The Attorney 
General argued that the statute conflicted with the State Board of 
Land Commissioners’ constitutional duty, under Article IX, 
Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, to achieve the highest price for 
disposal of endowment land through use of an auction.38 The 
district court did not agree, ultimately concluding that Idaho Code 
Section 58–310A did not conflict with Article IX, Section 8 of the 
Idaho Constitution.39 
The Supreme Court, however, invalidated Section 58–310A on 
the basis that the operative word in the Idaho Constitution, 
“disposal,” was held to include the sale or lease of the property.40 
The Court’s decision was based on the word’s usage in Article IX, 
Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution and in prior Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting that section.41 This decision rebuked the 
notion that certain uses of endowment lands were exempt from the 
constitutional decree that endowment lands be managed “in such 
                                                          
 35. Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Comm’r., 280 P.3d 693, 153 Idaho 190 (2012).  
 36. 280 P.3d 693, 153 Idaho 190 (2012).  
 37. Id. at 696, 153 Idaho at 192. 
 38. Id. at 695–96, 153 Idaho at 192–93. 
 39. Id. at 696, 153 Idaho at 193. 
 40. Id. at 699–700, 153 Idaho at 196–97.  
 41. Id.  
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manner as will secure the maximum long-term financial return.”42 
This unanimous decision was a clear reminder from the Court of 
endowment land managers’ constitutional duty to seek the highest 
possible return from endowments lands, regardless of whether 
they are leased or sold.43 
As a former Idaho Attorney General, Justice Jones was in a 
unique position to rule on the merits of the case, but also on the 
threshold question of whether the Attorney General had standing 
to pursue the suit. Before ruling on the merits, the Court held that 
the Attorney General had standing to challenge the statute as the 
lawyer representing the endowment beneficiaries, who were 
necessarily injured when less revenue was generated in the leasing 
of endowment property.44 As a whole, the Court’s decision signaled 
a return to the principles outlined in the Idaho Constitution. By 
refusing to allow a statutory exception that would erode the state’s 
goal of maximizing return in the management of endowment lands, 
the Court, in a decision authored by Justice Jones, strengthened 
the Idaho Constitution by emphasizing the purpose of its provision 
above the statute in question. Idaho Code Section 58-310A 
reflected a shift in the law away from the foundational principles 
in the Idaho Constitution, and the decision by the Court returned 
the inquiry to the province of the language in Article IX, Section 8.    
C. Suhadolnik v. Pressman and Navo v. Bingham Memorial 
Hospital 
Justice Jones also influenced Idaho medical malpractice law 
in two decisions issued during his tenure, Suhadolnik v. 
Pressman45 and Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hospital46, that dealt 
with how the standard of care is established and what means can 
be used to establish it, particularly when employing out-of-area 
                                                          
 42. IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8. 
 43. Chief Justice Burdick and Justices Eismann, Horton, and Justice Pro Tem Trout 
concurred in the opinion. Wasden, 280 P.3d at 703, 153 Idaho at 200.   
 44. Id. at 699, 153 Idaho at 196. 
 45. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 254 P.3d 11, 151 Idaho 110 (2011). 
 46. Navo v. Bingham Mem’l Hosp., 373 P.3d 681, 160 Idaho 363 (2016). 
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experts.47 Justice Jim Jones did not author the majority opinion in 
Navo, but participated fully and joined it.48 
Suhadolnik concerned the extent to which out-of-area experts 
may rely on deposition testimony to familiarize themselves with 
the local standard of care.49 The Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Jones, declared that one way out-of-area experts may 
familiarize themselves with the local standard of care is “by 
speaking to a local specialist and by reviewing deposition 
testimony that establishes that the local standard is governed by a 
national standard.”50 Accordingly, the Court determined that the 
expert proffered by the plaintiffs needed to do more than review 
the medical records of the plaintiff and read the deposition 
testimony of the defendant to familiarize himself with the local 
standard of care.51 The Court took considerable time to outline 
several possible methods of familiarizing out-of-area experts with 
the local standard of care because it recognized the difficulty of 
finding appropriate local experts to consult with in small, insular 
communities.52 For example, the Court mentioned that it 
considered review of deposition testimony sufficient to familiarize 
an out-of-area expert with the local standard of care in cases where 
the out-of-area expert also consulted with local specialists about 
the local standard of care.53 Consultation with local specialists, it 
was noted, was not required by Idaho law, but was offered as the 
potential reason why out-of-area experts familiarization methods 
in some cases were more satisfactory.54 The Court also noted that 
out-of-area experts who had reviewed deposition testimony from 
                                                          
 47. Suhadolnik, 254 P.3d at 11, 151 Idaho at 110; Navo, 373 P.3d at 681, 160 Idaho 
at 363.  
 48. Navo, 373 P.3d at 683, 160 Idaho at 364.  
 49. Suhadolnik, 254 P.3d at 14, 151 Idaho at 113.  
 50. Id. at 18, 151 Idaho at 117.  
 51. Id. at 18–23, 151 Idaho at 117–22. 
 52. Id. at 22, 151 Idaho at 121. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
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multiple people acquainted with the local standard of care were 
more likely to be sufficiently acquainted with the local standard of 
care than the expert employed in Suhadolnik, who had reviewed 
just one.55 This decision, while frowning on the methods employed 
by the plaintiff’s expert in the case, provided guidance to the bar 
about proper methods of familiarizing out-of-area experts with 
local standards of care. It also potentially enabled greater numbers 
of injured plaintiffs to overcome the difficulties associated with 
establishing the local standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases.  
In Navo, the Court outlined two ways an out-of-area expert 
may familiarize themselves with the local standard of care: 1) by 
consulting with a local specialist or 2) by demonstrating that a 
statewide or national standard of care has replaced the local 
standard of care, usually by reference to the applicable codes.56 
After spelling out the different methods, however, the Court 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the out-of-area expert used 
by the plaintiffs in the case had failed to adequately familiarize 
himself.57 The expert had consulted with a registered nurse who 
was Associate Director of the State Board of Nursing, but there 
was not sufficient evidence to convince the district court that the 
nurse was familiar with the standard of care in Blackfoot, Idaho.58 
The expert claimed that the local standard of care was superseded 
by a statewide or national standard of care, with which he was 
familiar.59 However, the district court concluded that the standards 
alluded to by the expert did not provide a coherent standard of care 
sufficient to replace the local standard of care, and the Supreme 
Court agreed.60  
Interestingly, Navo, when read in conjunction with 
Suhadolnik, reveals a concerted effort by the Court to educate 
about possible ways plaintiffs may establish the local standard of 
care required in medical malpractice cases with out-of-area 
experts. If heeded, these cases have the potential to assist medical 
malpractice plaintiffs in the delicate work of building the strong, 
                                                          
 55. Id.  
 56. 373 P.3d at 689–90, 160 Idaho at 371–72. 
 57. Id. at 692, 160 Idaho at 374.  
 58. Id. at 690–91, 160 Idaho at 371–72.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 691–92, 160 Idaho at 372–73. 
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persuasive case essential to ultimate success. Justice Jones 
contributed to this evolution in the law by outlining a method 
himself in Suhadolnik, and by concurring in Navo, which 
mentioned several other methods that could be utilized by 
plaintiffs.    
III. PART III 
In addition to his contributions to the law through authorship 
of majority opinions, Justice Jones also advanced the law through 
his infrequent, but always well-stated concurrences and dissents. 
In his twelve years, he authored roughly 84 concurrences and 49 
dissenting opinions.61 Of those, three dissenting opinions which 
had the quickest and clearest impact will be discussed below.    
A. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor and 
Western Home Transport, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Labor 
In Giltner, Inc., v. Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor62, 
Giltner trucking company faced a hefty unemployment tax bill for 
“owner/operator” drivers it considered to be independent 
contractors, but that the Idaho Department of Commerce and 
Labor (“the Department”) considered to be employees of the 
company.63 The drivers operated under the federal highway 
authority of Giltner, but were responsible for fuel, maintenance, 
and incidental expenses and were paid a set percentage of each 
load delivered.64 The Supreme Court determined that the 
Department and the Idaho Industrial Commission correctly 
concluded that the drivers were employees of Giltner and that 
Giltner was responsible for unemployment taxes for those 
individuals.65 The Court’s analysis delineated the two-prong test 
an employer must satisfy to be exempted from paying 
unemployment taxes for certain workers, such as independent 
                                                          
 61. See generally Voting Pattern Analysis, supra note 2. 
 62. Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor, 179 P.3d 1071, 145 Idaho 
415 (2008).  
 63. 179 P.3d at 1074, 145 Idaho at 418. 
 64. Id. at 1074, 1076, 1081, 145 Idaho at 418, 420, 425. 
 65. Id. at 1074, 145 Idaho at 418. 
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contractors.66 In essence, the test requires that (1) the worker be 
“free from control or direction in the performance of his work” and 
that (2) the worker be “engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, profession, or business.”67 The Court concluded 
that the owner/operator drivers were free from direction and 
control in their work as required by the first prong, but that the 
drivers did not conduct an independent business sufficient to fulfill 
the second prong.68 The second prong was unfulfilled chiefly on the 
basis of one fact: that the drivers operated under Giltner’s 
Department of Transportation (DOT) motor carrier authority to 
transport freight between states.69 Thus, the Court determined 
that the drivers were Giltner employees and Giltner was liable for 
unpaid unemployment insurance taxes for them.70  
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Jones outlined the legal history 
of exemption analysis, in common law as well as legislative 
enactments, and concluded that the long-standing policy of the 
Court had been to apply a three-factor test to determine whether 
exemption was proper under the second prong.71 Accordingly, he 
disagreed with the majority’s use of a “single factor test,” which 
determined that the drivers were employees primarily on the basis 
of their use of Giltner’s DOT authority.72 Although his analysis of 
precedent emphasized the use of multiple factors in determining 
whether the worker was conducting an independent trade or 
business, Justice Jones also declined to apply the Department’s 
fifteen-factor test.73 Instead, Justice Jones would have applied the 
historical three-factor test, which he viewed as “not . . . onerous . . 
. or a high hurdle,” to conclude that the owner/operator drivers in 
question were not employees of Giltner.74 This dissent might have 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 1075, 145 Idaho at 419.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1076, 145 Idaho at 420. 
 69. Giltner, 179 P.3d at 1076, 145 Idaho at 420. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1077–83, 145 Idaho at 421–27 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 1083, 145 Idaho at 427. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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been like so many others, recorded but affecting little change, if not 
for Western Home Transport, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Labor,75 
a case decided six years later which addressed identical issues and 
came to the opposite conclusion.  
Western Home concerned a trucking company (Western Home) 
that provided for the transportation of oversized mobile homes.76 
The company, much like the company in Giltner, contracted with 
owner/operator drivers to transport the homes and these drivers 
operated under Western Home’s DOT motor carrier authority.77 
These drivers were treated by the company as independent 
contractors, but the Idaho Department of Labor concluded that 
they were not exempt from unemployment insurance tax 
requirements and that Western Home was liable for $13,277.93 in 
unpaid unemployment insurance taxes.78  
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the one-factor test elucidated in Giltner for analysis of the second 
exemption prong had proven “unjust, unwise, and incorrect” and 
overruled Giltner on that point.79 The Court concluded that 
focusing on DOT authority to the exclusion of other appropriate 
factors, as Giltner directed, ignored the nature of the trucking 
industry and focused on one factor that was often “completely 
inconsequential.”80 To bolster its reasoning, the Court also 
emphasized that federal regulations precluded owner operators 
from operating under their own DOT authority when they were 
working for a motor carrier with DOT authority.81 Western Home 
                                                          
 75. 318 P.3d 940, 155 Idaho 950 (2014). 
 76. Id. at 941, 155 Idaho at 951.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 942, 155 Idaho at 952.  
 79. Id. at 942–44, 155 Idaho at 952–54. 
 80. Id. at 943, 155 Idaho at 953. 
 81. Western Home Transport, Inc., 318 P.3d at 943, 155 Idaho at 953. This conclusion 
was particularly ironic, because, as mentioned above, the Court determined in Giltner that the 
drivers at issue were not engaged in an independent business precisely because they were not 
operating under their own DOT authority. Giltner, 179 P.3d at 1076, 145 Idaho at 420.    
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reflected the Court’s recognition that Justice Jones had taken a 
correct view of the law in Giltner, especially in regard to the 
trucking industry. Of course, the Court did not adopt Justice Jones’ 
reasoning outright in their revised holding, but  based their 
holding on a “new,” or at least previously undiscovered, federal 
trucking regulation that required contractors to operate under the 
motor carrier’s DOT authority.82 Regardless of how they arrived at 
the correct conclusion, Justice Jones said that he was glad that 
they finally “saw the light.”83 Justice Jones’ contribution here was 
to subtly guide the Court to the correct conclusion—which he had 
reached six years earlier— that provided clarity in the law for 
trucking and other industries that relied on independent 
contractors to conduct significant portions of their business. 
B. The Proviso Clause, City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman and City 
of Challis v. Consent of Governed Caucus 
In two cases decided over the course of his tenure, City of 
Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman84 and City of Challis v. Consent of 
Governed Caucus85, Justice Jones consistently disagreed with the 
Court’s strict interpretation of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution and its exception, the proviso clause. 86 Article VIII, 
Section 3 requires that cities obtain electoral approval for 
incurring indebtedness in excess of their annual budgets.87 The 
proviso clause is a clause in Section 3 that allows expenditures 
larger than cities’ annual income for “ordinary and necessary” 
expenses incidental to governing.88 Justice Jones’ dissents 
concerned the type of expenditures considered “ordinary and 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. Interview with Jim Jones, Retired Chief Justice, Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise, 
Idaho (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 84. City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 237 P.3d 1200, 149 Idaho 574 (2010). 
 85. City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus, 361 P.3d 485, 159 Idaho 398 
(2015). 
 86. See Fuhriman, 237 P.3d at 1206, 149 Idaho at 580; City of Challis, 361 P.3d at 
492,159 Idaho at 405. 
 87. ID. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
 88. Id. 
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necessary” sufficient to be legally incurred without electoral 
approval.89   
In Fuhriman, the City of Idaho Falls contracted with 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) to purchase power for 
provision to residents of the city.90 Prior to expiration of the 
contract, the parties sought to renew the contract for an additional 
17 years.91 The question presented was whether the city’s decision 
to renew their 17-year power purchase agreement with BPA was 
an acquisition that required electoral approval per Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, or whether it was an “ordinary 
and necessary” expense under the proviso clause.92 The Court 
concluded that its precedent required interpretation of the 
necessary prong of  “ordinary and necessary” to include an 
immediate need for the project to be completed within a year for 
the proviso clause to apply.93 Accordingly, the Court held that there 
was no immediate need for the contract to be entered into “as 
ample time existed during which Idaho Falls could have submitted 
this proposed contract to its taxpayers for a confirmatory vote” and 
thus the contract did not fit within the proviso clause.94 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Jones disagreed with the 
necessity-requires-urgency framework utilized by the Court, 
opining that precedent dictated a dichotomy between “new 
programs or construction” and “support of existing governmental 
functions” in proviso clause analysis.95 Using an analogy of a 
family’s decision to acquire a pet, he argued that common sense 
also supported this interpretation.96 To Justice Jones, continued 
                                                          
 89. See Fuhriman, 237 P.3d at 1206, 149 Idaho at 580; City of Challis, 361 P.3d at 
492,159 Idaho at 405.  
 90. Fuhriman, 237 P.3d at 1202, 149 Idaho at 576.  
 91. Id. at 1202, 1205, 149 Idaho at 576, 579. 
 92. Id. at 1202, 149 Idaho at 576. 
 93. Id. at 1204, 149 Idaho at 578.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 1206, 149 Idaho at 580. 
 96. Fuhriman, 237 P.3d at 1206, 149 Idaho at 580. 
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maintenance of an acquisition, whether it be an obligation to 
provide power to city residents, a new piece of equipment, or a 
family’s new pet, is an “incidental part of the initial decision” to 
acquire and thus should not be subject to the electoral approval 
requirement of Article VIII, Section 3.97 Because the City of Idaho 
Falls long ago decided to provide power to residents in its service 
area, the continued provision of that decision—power at 
reasonable rates secured by a long-term contract—had already 
been decided and did not need to be submitted to voters for 
approval.98    
In City of Challis, the city wished to update its water 
distribution system by replacing meters, aging pipes, and fire 
hydrants; installing a new telemetry system; and constructing a 
new pipeline to the airport.99 Again, the Court applied its 
“necessity-requires-urgency” bright-line rule for analyzing 
whether the expenditure was necessary under the “ordinary and 
necessary” language of the proviso clause.100 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the Court determined that the updates to the 
water system were not so urgent that they needed to be 
undertaken within that year, and as such were subject to Article 
VIII, Section 3 electoral approval.101 The Court emphasized that 
the “necessity-requires-urgency” inquiry was the proper approach 
in determining whether proposed city expenditures fit within the 
proviso clause, and acted to expand the application of the inquiry 
while upbraiding the district court for failing to apply it.102  
Again, Justice Jones crafted a lengthy dissent criticizing the 
Court’s emphasis on the “necessity-requires-urgency” bright line 
rule and questioning the legal foundation of the language.103 
According to Justice Jones, Dunbar104, the first case to intimate 
                                                          
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. City of Challis, 361 P.3d at 486–87,159 Idaho at 399–400. 
100. Id. at 489, 159 Idaho at 402. 
101. Id. at 490, 159 Idaho at 403. 
102. Id. at 489–90, 159 Idaho at 402–03. 
103. See generally id. at 492–98, 159 Idaho at 405–11. 
104. Dunbar v. Bd. of Comm’rs. of Canyon Cty., 49 P. 409, 5 Idaho 407 (1897).  
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that urgency was contemplated by the proviso clause, did so in 
language unnecessary to the decision in the case, which was 
subsequently cited to and “given legs” in the more recent cases of 
City of Boise v. Frazier105 and Fuhriman.106 Justice Jones decried 
the continued use of the doctrine on such a “shaky foundation” and 
continued to emphasize the real dichotomy that he saw in the 
Article VIII, section 3 cases—the split between a city’s proposal to 
acquire something new and a proposal to update or maintain 
existing fixtures or systems.107 In both Fuhriman and City of 
Challis, he also emphasized that the framers of the Idaho 
Constitution were practical people, who wanted voter approval and 
extended consideration of large new projects before they were 
begun. But, once approval was given, they did not want counties 
and cities to be burdened with constantly seeking approval for 
maintenance and upgrades of an existing system.108  
As Justice Jones noted in his dissent, the Court’s 
interpretation of the proviso clause “zigged and zagged over the 
years” between a broader and narrower reading of the proviso 
clause.109 By consistently opposing the narrower reading and 
continuing to emphasize the historical roots and common-sensical 
reasoning behind the new/existing dichotomy, Justice Jones hoped 
to lay the legal foundation for a shift in the law in future years. His 
ten total pages of dissent on the issue, which outline the legislative 
history surrounding the adoption of Article VIII, Section 3 and the 
evolution of the case law related to the matter will serve a solid 
foundation should a shift occur.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
How is impact measured? Is it in raw numbers of cases heard, 
opinions authored, and law clerks mentored? Or is it more properly 
                                                          
105. City of Boise v. Frazier, 137 P.3d 388, 143 Idaho 1 (2006).  
106. City of Challis, 361 P.3d at 495,159 Idaho at 408.  
107. Id.  
108. See generally id. at 492–98, 159 Idaho at 405–11; Fuhriman, 237 P.3d at 1206–
10, 149 Idaho at 580–84. 
109. Id.  
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measured in years of service? Over the course of his legal career, 
Justice Jones served the people of the State of Idaho for twenty 
years, eight as Attorney General and twelve as a Justice on Idaho’s 
highest court.110 Although the fame of his years as Attorney 
General may be difficult to surpass, his impact on Idaho law is 
amply noted in the volumes of cases he heard as a member of the 
Court. As indicated above, he oversaw shifts in the law as a 
member of the majority in Idaho Water Association, Wasden, 
Suhadolnik and Navo. In his dissents in Giltner, Fuhriman, and 
City of Challis he spoke out where he thought more shifting was 
needed. Given the nature of the law, and the way courts’ opinions 
build upon one another, this handful of decisions represents just a 
sampling of the impact of Justice Jones on Idaho jurisprudence.  As 
author of over 300 majority opinions,111 he will be cited and recited 
for years to come.   
                                                          
110. Robert Ehlert, No longer chief justice of the Idaho’s high court, Jim Jones has a 
few things to say, IDAHO STATESMAN (Jan. 13, 2017), 
http://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/robert-
ehlert/article126541659.html. 
111. See generally Voting Pattern Analysis, supra note 2. 
 
